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I. INTRODUCTION
In its final term, the Burger Court continued its counter-
revolution' in criminal procedure by issuing a series of rulings
that restructure the balance between the state and the crimi-
nally accused. The elevation of Justice Rehnquist to Chief Jus-
tice and the appointment of Justice Antonin Scalia to the
Court will certainly give this counterrevolution further impe-
tus. Before making predictions, however, it is first important
to identify the five major themes that have marked the Burger
Court's counterrevolution in criminal procedure and demon-
strate how these themes were illustrated by various decisions
this term during the 1985-86 term.
The first of these five themes is that the majority of the
Court is committed to the crime control model of the criminal
justice system. The majority is eager to accommodate the per-
ceived needs of law enforcement and to assist the police by
eliminating legal obstacles whenever possible. Unlike the
Warren Court, the Burger Court has generally presumed the
regularity of police conduct. Consequently, the Court places a
heavy burden on a criminal defendant to demonstrate the
unlawfulness of police conduct. While the Warren Court was
often concerned with bridging the gap between its perception
of police practices and the constitutional ideal, the Burger
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Court has believed that actual police practices generally com-
ply with the constitutional ideal.
The second theme which has marked the Burger Court
counterrevolution is that certain constitutional rights of a
criminal defendant are considered less important than others.
This hierarchy or ranking of rights is determined by asking
how much impact does the right in question have on the issue
of the defendant's guilt or innocence? Because the Court views
convicting the guilty as the ultimate mission of the criminal
justice system, rights which most impact the determination of
guilt are accorded higher status. Thus, the right to jury trial,
the right to counsel, and the right to public trial have received
close scrutiny from the Burger Court. The fifth amendment
right to be free from compelled self-incrimination receives
somewhat less scrutiny, especially when it involves the prophy-
lactic rules of Miranda, as opposed to a truly involuntary con-
fession. At the bottom of the hierarchy is the fourth
amendment right prohibiting unreasonable searches and
seizures. The Burger Court clearly has taken a negative view
of the fourth amendment and its unpopular exclusionary rem-
edy because the Court believes they interfere with, and some-
times contradict, the Court's view of the mission of the
criminal justice system; to convict the guilty and acquit the
innocent.
The third theme of the Burger Court has been a prefer-
ence for analyzing issues on a case-by-case basis rather than
announcing clear-cut rules in criminal decisions. The Court
has been reluctant to set forth any rules, perhaps because of its
own difficulty in reaching any broad consensus beyond the
decision in the case before it. For example, the Court's deci-
sions have even blurred formerly well-established rules such as
the need to give Miranda warnings. While the Court appar-
ently is trying to be supportive of law enforcement concerns,
the Court's preference for case-by-case decision making will
actually work, in the long run, to the detriment of police
officers, trial courts, and criminal justice practitioners who will
all be at a loss as to what police may lawfully do.
The fourth theme of the Burger Court is related to all the
others, and perhaps explains the Burger Court's preference for
case-by-case adjudication. The fourth theme is that the consti-
tutional claims of a defendant are often subsidiary, in the
Court's view, to the issue of whether or not the defendant is in
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fact guilty. This theme has created not only a fact-specific
style of argument before the Court, but it has also resulted in
the development and refinement of various fact-specific legal
doctrines such as inevitable discovery and harmless error.
The fifth and final theme of the Burger Court counterrev-
olution has been the institution of a new federalism and the
transfer of power from federal courts to state courts to inter-
pret the meaning of constitutional rights in state criminal
cases. The Burger Court has been so successful in closing the
doors of the federal courts to state prisoners that the fifth
theme has almost been dormant in recent years, although the
Court this term made several important pronouncements in
this area. This theme is important because it is perhaps the
Burger Court's most enduring legacy in the area of criminal
justice. By limiting the access of state prisoners to federal
habeas review, the Burger Court has effectively insulated state
criminal convictions from federal court oversight and thereby
granted state judges considerable authority to interpret the
Federal Constitution. The long-term implications of this
theme are obvious.
II. THE CRIME CONTROL MODEL
The crime control model of criminal justice has clearly
been a predominant theme of the Burger Court and has gained
considerable momentum since the appointment of Justice
O'Connor. Several significant cases during the final term have
demonstrated the Burger Court's determination to assist law
enforcement personnel, especially in their battles against drug
traffickers. In addition, the Court has also illustrated its crime
control mentality by trying to assist prosecutors in several
ways during the 1985-86 term.
The two aerial search cases during the final term are
prime examples of the Court's crime control mentality at
work. In California v. Ciraolo,2 the Court held that a warrant-
less, naked-eye observation of a field by police officers flying at
1000 feet in a small aircraft did not constitute a search under
the fourth amendment. Similarly, in Dow Chemical Co. v.
United States,3 the Court held that the government's warrant-
less taking of aerial photographs was not a search under the
fourth amendment.
2. 106 S.Ct. 1809 (1986).
3. 106 S.Ct. 1819 (1986).
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In Ciraolo, police officers received an anonymous tip that
marijuana was growing in Ciraolo's backyard.4 Police officers
were unable to view the contents of the yard because it was
enclosed by both a 6-foot fence and a 10-foot inner fence. The
officers then obtained a private plane, flew over the yard and
determined marijuana was growing. A search warrant was
then obtained to seize the marijuana plants. Ciraolo was later
convicted of cultivating marijuana. The California Court of
Appeal reversed the conviction on the ground that the war-
rantless aerial observation of Ciraolo's yard violated the fourth
amendment.
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, reversed, holding
that Ciraolo had no constitutionally protected expectation of
privacy as to his "unlawful agricultural pursuits."5 The Court
asserted that Ciraolo's expectation of privacy was unreasonable
because anyone flying in the airspace "could have seen every-
thing that these officers observed."'6 Thus police traveling in
the airways are not required to obtain a warrant "in order to
observe what is visible to the naked eye."
7
In Dow, the Court approved the taking of aerial photo-
graphs of an industrial plant complex. The Court held 5-4 that
the open areas of Dow's industrial plant complex are similar to
an open field which is "open to the view and observation of
persons in aircraft lawfully in the public airspace. ' As such,
the taking of aerial photographs by the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency did not constitute a search for purposes of the
fourth amendment.
Although the decision in Dow is indicative of the crime
control mentality, the Court emphasized that its holding was
limited to aerial observation and photographing of an outdoor
commercial facility.
In another fourth amendment case, New York v. C/ass,9
the Court also demonstrated its commitment to the crime con-
trol model of criminal justice. In C/ass, the Court held 5-4 that
a police officer can constitutionally reach into an automobile to
move papers in order to observe the car's Vehicle Identification
Number (VIN). The Court indicated that the police officer's
4. Id. at 1810.
5. Id. at 1812-13.
6. Id. at 1813.
7. Id.
8. Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 1826.
9. 106 S.Ct. 960 (1986).
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actions were not unreasonable especially in light of the perva-
sive regulation of automobiles and the lesser expectation of
privacy citizens have in cars, boats, planes, trains, and, since
1985, motorhomes. Clearly, the Court's opinion was designed
to be supportive of law enforcement personnel. Indeed, the
Court indicated that any other result in the case "would
expose police officers to potentially grave risks without signifi-
cantly reducing the instrusiveness of [their] ultimate
conduct."'
Several other cases during the final term reflect the
Court's crime control model of criminal procedure and demon-
strate the Court's desire to assist not only police officers, but
also prosecutors in their efforts to convict the guilty. For
example, in United States v. Inadi," the Court held 7-2 that
the Confrontation Clause of the sixth amendment does not
require a prosecutor to show that a co-conspirator is unavaila-
ble as a condition for admitting the co-conspirator's out-of-
court statements. The majority emphasized that requiring
prosecutors to make a showing of unavailability would detract
from the "truth-determining process," while at the same time
it would impose a substantial burden on the entire criminal
justice system. 2 In explaining its decision, the Court discussed
the law enforcement concerns which influenced the result:
[A]n unavailability rule places a significant practical
burden on the prosecution. In every case involving co-con-
spirator statements, the prosecution would be required to
identify with specificity each declarant, locate those declar-
ants, and then endeavor to ensure their continuing availabil-
ity for trial. Where declarants are incarcerated there is the
burden on prison officials and marshals of transporting them
to and from the courthouse, as well as the increased risk of
escape. For unincarcerated declarants the unavailability
rule would require that during the sometimes lengthy period
before trial the Government must endeavor to be aware of
the whereabouts of the declarant or run the risk of a court
determination that its efforts to produce the declarant did
not satisfy the test of "good faith."13
The Court also assisted prosecutors during the final term
10. Id. at 968.
11. 106 S. Ct. 1121 (1986).
12. Id. at 1128.
13. Id.
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in a case dealing with jury selection. In Lockhart v. McCree,"4
the Court held 6-3 that the fair cross-section and impartial jury
rights guaranteed by the sixth amendment are not violated by
the exclusion, prior to the guilt phase, of prospective jurors
who are strongly opposed to death penalty. The Court rejected
as unpersuasive numerous studies introduced by McCree to
show that "death-qualified" juries are prone to convict defend-
ants.'5 Even assuming that such juries are more conviction
prone, the Court held that death-qualified juries do not violate
the sixth amendment. Justice Marshall's dissent accused the
Court of approving "a practice that allows the state a special
advantage in those prosecutions where the charges are the
most serious and the possible punishments, the most severe."16
The Court's most significant double jeopardy case during
the final term also reflects the crime control model of criminal
justice. In Heath v. Alabama,"7 the Court held that successive
prosecutions by two States for the same conduct are not barred
by the double jeopardy clause. The Court rejected the defend-
ant's contention that successive prosecutions should only be
permitted when the different states have different interests in
bringing a defendant to justice: "A State's interest in vindicat-
ing its sovereign authority through enforcement of its laws by
definition can never be satisfied by another State's enforce-
ment of its own laws.' 1
8
III. THE HIERARCHY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
As discussed previously, the Burger Court has created a
hierarchy of rights; rights perceived to have significant impact
on the determination of guilt at trial receiving more scrutiny,
and rights which are deemed merely prophylactic or which the
Court believes may actually impede the quest for accurate fact
finding. In the instant term, the Court has added a new wrin-
kle to this ranking of rights by placing a series of cases dealing
with racial discrimination at the top of the hierarchy. Through-
out these decisions, the Court indicated that racial discrimina-
tion in the criminal justice system can impact not only the
14. 106 S.Ct. 1758 (1986).
15. Id. at 1763-64.
16. Id. at 1780-81.
17. 106 S.Ct. 433 (1986).
18. Id. at 440.
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determination of guilt but also the public perception of the sys-
tem's fairness.
The Court first held, in Vasquez v. Hillery,9 that system-
atic racial discrimination in the selection of the grand jury that
indicted a defendant requires reversal of the defendant's con-
viction. In a strongly-worded opinion, the Court rejected the
notion that the harmless error doctrine should be applied to
claims of grand jury racial discrimination, which the Court
referred to as "a grave constitutional trespass."20 The Court
stressed the tremendous power of grand juries to alter charges,
to charge multiple counts or a single count, and to charge a
capital or non-capital offense, and concluded that racial dis-
crimination in the selection of a grand jury "undermines the
... integrity of the criminal tribunal itself."'2 1
In another strongly-worded opinion, the Court invalidated
a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude mem-
bers of a defendant's race from a petit jury. In Batson v. Ken-
tucky,22 the Court concluded that the equal protection clause
forbids a prosecutor from using peremptory challenges to
exclude potential jurors solely on account of their race. Such a
practice denies the defendant the protection a jury is designed
to afford, robs potential jurors of their right to serve as jurors
and "undermine[s] public confidence in the fairness of our sys-
tem of justice. '23
Under Batson,24 a defendant may establish a prima facie
case of purposeful discrimination solely on evidence concern-
ing the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges at the
defendant's trial.25 The defendant must show that he is a
member of a cognizable racial group; that the prosecutor used
peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of
defendant's race; and, the defendant must show that the facts
and circumstances create an inference that the prosecutor
excluded veniremen on account of their race. Once such a
showing is made, the burden shifts to the State to advance a
neutral explanation for the exclusion of jurors. Absent a neu-
19. 106 S.Ct. 617 (1986).
20. Id. at 624.
21. Id. at 623.
22. 106 S.Ct. 1712 (1986).
23. Id. at 1718-21.
24. Id. at 1722-23.
25. I& at 1723.
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tral explanation, the defendant's conviction must be reversed.26
In Turner v. Murray,27 a case decided the same day as Bat-
son, the Court held that a capital defendant accused of an
interracial crime is entitled to have prospective jurors
informed of the victim's race and entitled to voir dire question-
ing regarding the issue of racial prejudice. The divided Court
found significant that the defendant was charged with a capital
crime and that the jury in such a case is called upon to make a
subjective judgment regarding an appropriate punishment.
According to the Court, the range of discretion such a jury has
at sentencing presents a "unique opportunity for racial preju-
dice to operate but remain undetected. '2' The risk of racial
prejudice during a capital sentencing proceeding is "especially
serious in light of the complete finality of the death sen-
tence. '29 Because of this, a capital defendant accused of an
interracial crime is entitled, upon request, to have prospective
jurors questioned regarding racial basis.
In addition to the racial discrimination cases during the
final term, the Court also decided several cases which indicate
the primacy of the sixth amendment's trial-related rights in
the Court's hierarchy. For example, in Maine v. Moulton,3 ° the
Court held 5-4 that the sixth amendment right to counsel was
violated by police when they arranged to record conversations
between an indicted defendant and his co-defendant. The
Court emphasized the importance of the right to counsel, indi-
cating that it is "indispensable" to the system of criminal jus-
tice because it "safeguards the other rights deemed essential
for the fair prosecution of a criminal proceeding."31 The Court
thus held unconstitutional the state's "knowing exploitation"
of the "accused's right to have counsel present in a confronta-
tion between the accused and a state agent.
32
In another right to counsel case, Michigan v. Jackson,33
the Court held that once a defendant requests counsel, police
may not initiate interrogation until counsel has been made
available to the suspect. Relying on the "bright-line rule" of
26. Id.
27. 106 S.Ct. 1683 (1986).
28. Id. at 1687.
29. Id. at 1688.
30. 106 S.Ct. 477 (1986).
31. Id. at 483-84.
32. Id. at 487.
33. 106 S.Ct. 1404 (1986).
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Edwards v. Arizona,34 the majority held that a defendant's
right to counsel at a post-arraignment, custodial interrogation
was clear beyond doubt.3 5 The only issue, according to the
Court, was whether the defendants had validly waived their
right to counsel by signing written waivers. Relying on the"presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional
rights," the Court concluded that the written waivers were
insufficient to allow police-initiated interrogation after the
defendants requested counsel.3 6
One of the last cases during the final term, Kimmelman v.
Morrison,3 7 contains one of the Court's clearest expressions of
its hierarchy of rights. In Kimmelman, the Court held that
the limitations on habeas review of fourth amendment claims
should not be extended to apply to sixth amendment claims.
The Court noted that the sixth amendment right to counsel is
"beyond question a fundamental right" which is essential to a
fair trial and all of the accused's other constitutional rights.3 8
However, fourth amendment rights, especially when coupled
with the judicially created exclusionary rule, are not designed
to ensure the fairness of a criminal trial and are therefore sub-
ject to a lesser scrutiny. Thus, fourth amendment claims can-
not be reviewed in a federal habeas petition when the
petitioner has been afforded a full and fair opportunity to raise
his claims in state court.39 By contrast, sixth amendment
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel when raised in a
habeas petition are not limited in the same manner. The Court
explained: "Because collateral review will frequently be the
only means through which an accused can effectuate the right
to counsel, restricting the litigation of some sixth amendment
claims to trial and direct review would seriously interfere with
an accused's right to effective representation."4
Fifth amendment claims in the final term continued to
receive less scrutiny than sixth amendment cases. In addition,
the Court continues to place more importance on fifth amend-
ment cases that involve issues of the voluntariness of confes-
sions, as opposed to those cases involving Miranda-based
34. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
35. Michigan, 106 S. Ct. at 1407.
36. Id. at 1409 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
37. 106 S.Ct. 2574 (1986).
38. Id. at 2583.
39. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
40. Kimmleman, 106 S. Ct. at 2585.
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claims. With regard to voluntariness, the Court first held 8-1,
in Miller v. Fenton,41 that the voluntariness of a confession is
an issue of law upon which a federal court must make an
independent determination, even in a habeas proceeding. The
Court emphasized that the issue of whether a confession is vol-
untary involves the Due Process Clause and its guarantee of
"fundamental fairness."' Relying on "nearly a half century of
unwavering precedent," and congressional intent, the Court
concluded that, in the context of confessions, independent fed-
eral review of the voluntariness of confessions is required.43
In another voluntariness case, the Court in Crane v. Ken-
tucky 44 held that the trial court denied the defendant's right to
present a defense by refusing to admit evidence regarding the
environment in which police secured his confession. The trial
court excluded such evidence after making the determination
that the confession was voluntary. In a sharply-written unani-
mous opinion, the Supreme Court reversed, explaining that the
environment in which a confession is secured is relevant not
only to the determination of voluntariness but also to the relia-
bility and credibility of the confession.4 Accordingly, a blan-
ket exclusion of profferred evidence regarding the
circumstances of a confession deprives the defendant of his
right to a fair trial.
In another unanimous decision, the Court in Wainwright
v. Greenfield46 condemned a prosecutor's use of the defend-
ant's silence after receiving Miranda warnings to counter
defendant's claim of insanity. Relying on Doyle v. Ohio,47 the
Court concluded that due process is violated whenever a prose-
cutor uses a defendant's silence after Miranda warnings as evi-
dence against him either for impeachment or as evidence of
sanity.48 The Court reiterated that the Miranda warnings con-
tain an implied promise, rooted in the Constitution, that
"silence will carry no penalty. '49
In a case which raised both fifth and sixth amendment
41. 106 S.Ct. 445 (1986).
42. Id. at 453.
43. Id. at 454.
44. 106 S.Ct. 2142 (1986).
45. Id. at 2146.
46. 106 S.Ct. 634 (1986).
47. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
48. Greentfeld, 106 S. Ct. at 639.
49. Id. at 641 (quoting Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618).
[Vol. 10:571
1987] The Counter revolution In Criminal Procedure 581
claims, Moran v. Burbine,° the Court rejected challenges to
the defendant's waiver of his fifth and sixth Amendment
rights. The defendant executed a series of written waivers and
confessed to the murder of a young woman. At no point did he
request an attorney, although his sister had obtained an attor-
ney without his knowledge. Also unbeknownst to the defend-
ant, the attorney called the police station and advised the
detectives that she was representing the defendant. She was
assured that the police would not be questioning the defendant
or putting him in a lineup that evening. An hour later, the
defendant was questioned by police, signed written waivers of
his rights and signed three statements admitting the murder.51
The Court majority concluded that the defendant's waiver
of his rights was valid notwithstanding the failure of the police
to inform him of the telephone call from his attorney.52 The
Court rejected the defendant's contentions that the values
underpinning Miranda require reversal of a conviction when
the police mislead an attorney or fail to inform a suspect of an
attorney's efforts to reach him.53 The Court noted that the
Miranda warnings are not constitutional rights themselves but
are instead only measures designed to protect the right against
compelled self-incrimination.'
As noted previously, the fourth amendment claims raised
in California v. Ciraolo,55 Dow v. United States,56 and New
York v. Class57 all received short shrift from the Court. In one
other significant fourth amendment case, New York v. P.J.
Video,58 the Court rejected the contention that a higher prob-
able-cause standard is mandated when issuing warrants to
seize such things as books or movies under obscenity statutes.
Although the Court "recognized that the seizure of films or
books . . . implicates First Amendment concerns," the Court
nonetheless held that no higher probable-cause standard is
required.59 The seizure of films or books requires the same
probable cause showing as with other evidence, namely, a
50. 106 S.Ct. 1135 (1986).
51. Id. at 1139.
52. Id. at 1141-42.
53. Id. at 1143.
54. Id. (citing New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984)).
55. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
56. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
57. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
58. 106 S.Ct. 1610 (1986).
59. Id. at 1614.
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showing of a probability or substantial chance of criminal
activity.'
IV. CASE-BY-CASE REVIEW
The Burger Court's tendency to avoid rule-oriented deci-
sions has been a constant source of criticism. Although the
Court states that it wants to be supportive of law enforcement,
at the same time it has unnecessarily blurred previously
bright-line rules governing law enforcement conduct.
The Burger Court's preference for case-by-case decision-
making was expressed clearly during the final term by the
retiring Chief Justice himself in his concurrence in Michigan
v. Jackson.6 ' In the case, the Court majority continued the
bright-line rule of Edwards v. Arizona62 by holding that once
an accused requests appointment of counsel, no further inter-
rogation may be initiated by the police. Expressing his reluc-
tance to join the Court's decision, Chief Justice Burger wrote:
The urge for "bright-line" rules readily applicable to a
host of varying situations would likely relieve this Court
somewhat from more than a doubling of the Court's work in
recent decades, but this urge seems to be leading the Court
to an absolutist, mechanical treatment of the subject. At
times, it seems, the judicial mind is in conflict with what
behavioral and theological-specialists have long recognized
as a natural human urge of people to confess wrongdoing.63
One notable example of the confusion resulting from the
Court's case-by-case approach is the Dow case involving aerial
photography of an industrial plant.64 The Court asserted that
Dow's outdoor manufacturing facility was more like an "open
field" as opposed to the curtilage of the plant.65 Left unan-
swered, however, is the critical question of where curtilage
ends and the open field begins. The Court even admits that
Dow's plant "fall[s] somewhere between 'open fields' and curti-
lage" while "lacking some of the critical characteristics of
both. '66 Yet, the Court leaves police, practitioners and trial
60. Id. at 1615.
61. 106 S. Ct. 1404, 1411 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
62. 451 U.S. 477 (1981). See also supra note 34 and accompanying text.
63. Michigan, 106 S. Ct. at 1411 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
64. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
65. Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 1827.
66. Id. at 1825-26.
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courts guessing as to how the decision in Dow was reached and
how to determine in future factual situations whether an area
is more like open fields or more like curtilage. In addition, the
Court fails to provide any guidance for future cases where the
photography is part of a criminal, as opposed to regulatory,
investigation or where significant enhancement and magnifica-
tion of human vision is employed. The lingering questions
remaining as a result of Dow clearly demonstrate the draw-
backs of the Court's case-by-case approach.
Two other cases during the final term demonstrate the
Court's preference for case-by-case analysis as opposed to rule-
oriented decisions. First, in Holbrook v. Flynn,67 the Court held
that claims of prejudice from the presence of security guards at
trial should be analyzed on a case-by-case basis. Unfortu-
nately, the Court does not offer any guidance as to when the
presence of uniformed guards becomes prejudicial.
Similarly, in McMillan v. Pennsylvania,8 the Court
explicitly acknowledges that it is not providing any guidance as
to when a statute is unconstitutional for violating the due pro-
cess standards enunciated in In re Winship. 9 Although the
majority in McMillan upheld Pennsylvania's Mandatory Mini-
mum Sentencing Act, Justice Rehnquist admitted that the
Court was unable to lay down any "bright line" test for deter-
mining the constitutionality of a statute, and that future situa-
tions may depend on "differences of degree."70 Differentiating
between degrees, however, requires some guidance, but the
Court fails to provide any.
V. THE IMPORTANCE OF FACTUAL GUILT
One of the overriding themes of the Burger Court's
counter-revolution in criminal procedure has been the Court's
emphasis on the factual guilt of the particular defendant chal-
lenging a conviction. One of the outgrowths of the Court's
emphasis on factual guilt has been the harmless error doctrine,
which was significantly expanded this term.
For example, in United States v. Lane,7 the Court held
that misjoinder of defendants in violation of the Federal Rules
67. 106 S.Ct. 1340 (1986).
68. 106 S.Ct. 2411 (1986).
69. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
70. 106 S.Ct. at 2413-20.
71. 106 S.Ct. 725 (1986).
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of Criminal Procedure is subject to harmless error analysis and
does not require reversal unless the prejudice from misjoinder
influences the jury's verdict. The Court proceeded to apply the
harmless error analysis to the facts in Lane and concluded that
"[i]n the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt shown here,
... the claimed error was harmless."72
In United States v. Mechanik,73 the Court extended the
harmless error doctrine to a case where two witnesses
appeared and testified simultaneously before the grand jury
which indicted the defendants. The joint appearance and testi-
mony before the grand jury violated the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The Court concluded that the petit jury's
guilty verdict against the defendants demonstrated that there
was probable cause to indict the defendants and that the joint
testimony before the grand jury was therefore harmless.74 In
reaching its decision, the Court explained that a rule of auto-
matic reversal entails substantial social costs which should
only be borne when an error affects the determination of guilt
or innocence.75 Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority:
The reversal of a conviction entails substantial social
costs: it forces jurors, witnesses, courts, the prosecution and
the defendants to expend further time, energy, and other
resources to repeat a trial that has already once taken place;
victims may be asked to relive their disturbing experiences.
The "[p]assage of time, erosion of memory, and disperson of
witnesses may render retrial difficult, even impossible."
Thus, while reversal "may, in theory, entitle the defendant
only to retrial, in practice it may reward the accused with
complete freedom from the prosecution," and thereby "cost
society the right to punish admitted offenders." Even if a
defendant is convicted in a second trial, the intervening
delay may compromise society's "interest in the prompt
administration of justice," and impede accomplishment of
the objectives of deterrence and rehabilitation. These socie-
tal costs of reversal and retrial are an acceptable and often
necessary consequence when an error in the first proceeding
has deprived a defendant of a fair determination of the issue
of guilt or innocence. But the balance of interest tips decid-
edly the other way when an error has had no effect on the
72. Id. at 732.
73. 106 S.Ct. 938 (1986).
74. Id. at 942.
75. Id.
[Vol. 10:571
1987] The Counter revolution In Criminal Procedure 585
outcome of the trial.z6
In Delaware v. Van Arsdell,77 the Court again expanded
the harmless error doctrine to apply to cases where a defend-
ant is unconstitutionally denied his right, under the confronta-
tion clause, to impeach a witness for bias. In Van Arsdell, the
trial judge had improperly prohibited the defendant from
cross-examining a witness who may have been biased as a
result of the State's dismissal of pending criminal charges
against the witness.78 The Court agreed that the limitation on
cross-examination violated the defendant's rights under the
confrontation clause. However, the Court reaffirmed its prior
holding in Chapman v. California7 9 that certain constitutional
errors may be harmless, including the denial of a defendant's
right to cross-examine a witness for bias.80 The Court
remanded the case to the Delaware courts to determine
whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The importance the Court attaches to factual guilt also
showed itself in Morris v. Mathews."l In Morris, the Court
held that a conviction barred by the double jeopardy clause can
be remedied by reducing the conviction to a lesser-included
offense that is not jeopardy barred. Although the Court
expressly stated that the case was not subject to harmless
error analysis, the Court's decision indicates that a fact-ori-
ented analysis of a defendant's guilt must be undertaken to
determine the appropriate remedy for the double jeopardy
clause violation. The Court indicated that, when a state seeks
to remedy a double jeopardy violation by reducing the convic-
tion to a lesser included offense, the burden shifts to the
defendant.8 2 In order to obtain a new trial, the defendant must
show a reasonable probability that he would not have been
convicted of the non-jeopardy-barred offense, but for the pres-
ence of the jeopardy-barred offense.8 3 The standard adopted
by the Court necessitates that a reviewing court consider the
strength of the evidence establishing the defendant's guilt to
76. Id. at 942-43 (citations omitted).
77. 106 S.Ct. 1431 (1986).
78. Id. at 1433.
79. 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (announcing harmless-error standard to be applied).
80. Van Arsdell, 106 S. Ct. at 1436.
81. 106 S.Ct. 1032 (1986).
82. Id. at 1038.
83. Id.
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determine whether or not there is a reasonable probability
that he would not have been convicted.
In one of the final decisions of the Burger Court,
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 4 a plurality of the Court held that a
"successive," or second, habeas petition must be denied unless
the petitioner supplements his constitutional claims with "a
colorable showing of factual innocence."8' Moreover, when
considering whether a petitioner has made a sufficient showing
of innocence, a court should review all probative evidence of
guilt or innocence, even evidence illegally admitted. 6 The
Court's emphasis on factual guilt was thus clearly demon-
strated in Kuhlmann.
VI. THE NEW FEDERALISM
One of the most significant changes implemented by the
Burger Court in the area of criminal procedure is the great
deference which is now paid to state court decisions regarding
constitutional rights. In case after case, the Court has limited
the ability of convicted individuals to obtain collateral review
of their convictions through the writ of habeas corpus. For
example, in Stone v. Powell,8 7 the Court announced that a con-
victed individual cannot raise fourth amendment claims in a
habeas petition when the state has already given the individual
a full and fair hearing on those claims. In other cases, the
Court has indicated that various factual determinations made
in state courts are entitled to a presumption of correctness in
federal habeas cases. The doors of the federal courts were shut
so dramatically by the Burger Court that in the last several
years only a small number of habeas cases have been decided
by the Court. Late in the final term, however, the Court
handed down several significant habeas decisions which con-
firm that the federal courthouse doors are shut, although not
completely.
In two habeas cases, the Court revisited Wainwright v.
Sykes,88 in which the Court held that a federal habeas peti-
tioner, who has failed to comply with state procedures for rais-
ing a constitutional claim, cannot litigate the constitutional
84. 106 S.Ct. 2616 (1986).
85. Id. at 2627.
86. Id. at 2622-24.
87. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
88. 433 U.S. 72 (1972).
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claim in a federal habeas proceeding unless he can show cause
for his procedural default and prejudice attributable thereto.
In Smith v. Murray,9 the Court held 5-4 that a deliberate,
tactical decision by counsel does not constitute cause for a pro-
cedural default under the Wainwright v. Sykes standard.9"
Justice O'Connor wrote, "Our cases . . .leave no doubt that a
deliberate, tactical decision not to pursue a particular claim is
the very antithesis of the kind of circumstance that would war-
rant excusing a defendant's failure to adhere to a state's legiti-
mate rules for the fair and orderly disposition of its criminal
cases."'" The Court emphasized that the petitioner's counsel
had deliberately decided to abandon on appeal his objections to
the admission of certain testimony.9 2 The deliberate nature of
the decision to not pursue this issue was dispositive on the
"cause" requirement, according to the majority.93
Similarly, in Murray v. Carrier,94 the Court held 7-2 that a
federal habeas petitioner cannot show cause for a procedural
default in state court merely by establishing that competent
defense counsel inadvertently failed to recognize or raise a par-
ticular substantive claim. Unless defense counsel's perform-
ance was constitutionally ineffective, mere error or
inadvertence by an attorney does not establish cause under
Wainwright v. Sykes.9" Justice O'Connor, writing for five
members of the Court, explained that the cause-and-prejudice
limitation on federal habeas review was designed to reduce the
enormous societal costs of habeas intervention, including the
"reduction in the finality of litigation and the frustration of
'both the States' sovereign power to punish offenders and their
good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights.' "9
Interestingly, the Court in Murray v. Carrier,97 also indi-
cated, in what may be dicta, that the cause-and-prejudice limi-
tation is not absolute. The majority asserted the "the
principles of comity and finality that inform the concepts of
cause and prejudice 'must yield to the imperative of correcting
89. 106 S.Ct. 2661 (1986).
90. 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (cause and prejudice rule requires court to defer to state
court judgments when decisions rest on independent state grounds).
91. Smith, 106 S. Ct. at 2666.
92. Id..
93. Id.
94. 106 S.Ct. 2639 (1986).
95. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
96. Carrier, 106 S. Ct. at 2645.
97. Id. at 2642-50.
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a fundamentally unjust incarceration.' "98 Thus, according to
Justice O'Connor, in an "extraordinary case," in which a con-
stitutional error resulted in the conviction of an innocent per-
son, a federal habeas court may grant the writ "even in the
absence of a showing of cause for the procedural default."99
Perhaps the Court wanted to indicate that the federal
courthouse doors are still open to correct manifest injustice,
but closed to repetitive, inconsequential claims of those who
are, without doubt, guilty.
While the Court in Murray v. Carrier"° suggested that
the federal courts are still open for certain habeas claims, in
Kimmelman v. Morrison'01 and Miller v. Fenton, °2 the Court
clearly held that the federal writ of habeas corpus is not a dead
letter. As discussed earlier, the Court in Kimmelman held that
sixth amendment claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are
not governed by the restrictions that Stone v. Powell'
0 3
imposes on fourth amendment claims. Justice Brennan, writ-
ing for six Justices in Kimmelman, explained that Stone dealt
"merely" with the exclusionary rule as opposed to the "funda-
mental right of criminal defendants" to have counsel."°
In Miller v. Fenton,' the Court held that the voluntari-
ness of a confession is a legal question requiring an independ-
ent federal determination. Thus, a state court's determination
of voluntariness is not an issue of fact entitled to a presump-
tion of correctness in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. The
Court held that "the ultimate question whether, under the
totality of the circumstances, [a] challenged confession was
obtained in a manner compatible with the requirements of the
Constitution is a matter for independent federal determina-
tion."'1 6 The Court pointed out that the voluntariness of a con-
fession has traditionally been subject to an independent federal
determination, that Congress did not intend voluntariness to
be a factual issue, and that the nature of the inquiry itself
leads to the conclusion that voluntariness is a legal question
98. Id. at 2646.
99. Id. at 2646-47.
100. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
104. Kimmelman, 106 S. Ct. at 2584.
105. See supra notes 41, 102 and accompanying text.
106. Fenton, 106 S. Ct. at 450.
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meriting independent consideration.10 7 Moreover, because con-
fessions frequently occur in a secretive, inherently coercive
environment, the Court indicated that independent federal
review more adequately protects the fourteenth amendment's
guarantee of fundamental fairness."0 '
VII. CONCLUSION
The Burger Court clearly has had a different approach
from the Warren Court with regard to the rights of the crimi-
nally accused. Indeed, in many significant respects, a counter-
revolution in criminal procedure has occurred in reaction to
the Warren Court's expansion of defendants' rights. Yet, the
counterrevolution has never been sweeping or complete. In
fact, a number of cases during the final term of the Burger
Court indicate that there are limits to the counterrevolution.
For example, although the Burger Court has tried to shut the
doors of the federal courts to habeas corpus petitioners, the
Court this term indicate that (1) sixth amendment claims in
federal habeas petitions are not subject to the same limitations
that apply to fourth amendment claims; (2) the cause-and-prej-
udice standard of Wainwright v. Sykes' 0 9 can be disregarded in
a habeas proceeding if it appears the petitioner was wrongfully
convicted; and, (3) a federal court must make an independent
determination in a habeas proceeding that a petitioner's confes-
sion is voluntary.
Moreover, despite its counterrevolutionary tendencies, the
Court actually expanded the rights of criminal defendants in
several significant ways this term. The Court limited the use
of peremptory challenges by prosecutors; 0 prohibited prosecu-
tors from using silence after Miranda warnings as evidence of
sanity;1 ' established an automatic reversal rule when racial
discrimination infects a grand jury;1 1 2 and, determined that,
once an accused requests counsel at arraignment, all police
interrogation must stop until counsel is appointed.' Indeed,
approximately one-third of the criminal cases decided by opin-
ion were clear-cut victories for criminal defendants. The Bur-
107. Id. at 452-53.
108. Id. at 453.
109. See supra notes 88 & 90 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
111. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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ger Court's counterrevolution thus has its limits and is not
entirely dogmatic.
Will the changes in the Court's composition increase its
counterrevolutionary fervor? Perhaps. Chief Justice Rehn-
quist is considered a more affable individual than the retiring
Chief Justice. And, by all accounts, Justice Antonin Scalia is a
convincing and persuasive jurist with a clear conservative bent.
Together they may be able to keep the counterrevolutionary
fire burning. Or perhaps the fires will slowly flicker out and
die. Only the decisions next term will give us any real
indication.
